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Abstract 
The Roman imperial Stoics were familiar with exile. This paper argues that the Stoics’ view of 
being a refugee differed sharply from their view of what is owed to refugees. A Stoic adopts the 
perspective of a cosmopolitēs, a “citizen of the world,” a rational being everywhere at home in 
the universe. Virtue can be cultivated and practiced in any locale, so being a refugee is an 
“indifferent” that poses no obstacle to happiness. Other people are our fellow cosmic citizens, 
however, regardless of their language, race, ethnicity, customs, or country of origin. Our 
natural affinity and shared sociability with all people require us to help refugees and embrace 
them as welcome neighbors. Failure to do so violates our common reason, justice, and the 
gods’ cosmic law. 
Keywords: exile, refugee, Stoic, cosmopolitanism, citizen 
Introduction 
One of the earliest stories about refugees in Western literature is told by the Roman epic 
poet Vergil. His Aeneid offers a heart-rending account of the hero Aeneas carrying his aged 
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father Anchises on his back, while leading his little son Ascanius by the hand, from the burning 
ruins of Troy. Few Trojans escape both death and enslavement at the hands of the Greek 
soldiers sacking their city, but Aeneas gathers together the few survivors and leads them on a 
long, perilous voyage across the Mediterranean Sea to distant Italy. There, after much more 
blood is shed, the refugee Aeneas finally prevails, establishes a new home for his transplanted 
people, and becomes the ancestor of the Romans. Vergil’s Aeneid may be the earliest refugee 
story in Latin literature (Kyle Helms, personal communication). What is certain is that the 
story of Aeneas and the other Trojan refugees is a tale thick with Stoic themes. 
Acclaimed since his own day as the Latin epic poet par excellence, Vergil 
displays a profound and perceptive feeling for the ethical and metaphysical 
implications of Stoic philosophy. To the extent that he appeals to Stoic 
principles in the Aeneid he internalizes them thoroughly and weaves them 
seamlessly into the web of his epic. Yet, he subordinates them ultimately to his 
own personal poetic vision. Vergil’s ability to grasp the inner significance of 
the Stoic doctrines which he uses points to the pervasive influence which this 
philosophy had attained in the Roman culture of his own day, for there is 
nothing in Vergil’s own education, associations, or style of life that suggests 
any Stoic inclinations on his part (Colish: 225; see also Edwards). 
This is one reason why an examination of Stoicism and refugees is warranted. But study of 
refugees through the lens of Stoic philosophy need not be limited to literary analysis of Vergil’s 
epic for the following reason. A refugee is a person forced to flee his or her homeland to escape 
danger or persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion. A person removed by authority from his or her homeland is 
an exile. Thus, refugees include those who are exiled because of their political opinions or 
(alleged) seditious activities. Exile was a frequent threat and a common punishment for many 
prominent Romans, including philosophers. The Stoic philosophers Seneca, Musonius Rufus, 
and Epictetus were all expelled by imperial authority from Rome. Therefore, how the Roman 
imperial Stoics thought about exile, and how Stoic ideas apply to refugees, is worth 
investigating. 
Lucius Annaeus Seneca – statesman, orator, tragedian, leading intellectual, and prolific 
author – was accused of adultery with emperor Claudius’ niece in 41 CE and exiled to Corsica 
for eight years. Gaius Musonius Rufus, the Roman knight (eques) and acclaimed Stoic teacher, 
chose to accompany his friend Rubellius Plautus into exile when Nero banished Plautus 
around 60 CE. After Plautus died, Musonius returned to Rome under the reign of Galba to 
teach and practice Stoicism. When Nero discovered the great conspiracy against him led by 
Calpurnius Piso in 65 CE, Nero ordered Seneca to commit suicide. Nero exiled Musonius to 
the island of Gyara in the Aegean Sea where, despite the notoriously desolate surroundings, 
Musonius reportedly continued to attract and teach students and conducted himself admirably 
(Reydams-Schils 2005: 103-4). Musonius’s most influential student was Epictetus. In 90 CE 
emperor Domitian expelled Epictetus and other philosophers from Rome because Stoics 
favorably received opponents of the emperor’s tyranny. 
So, the Stoics of the Roman empire were very familiar with exile. What did they think of 
it? I will argue that the Stoics’ view of being an exile differed sharply from their view of how 
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exiles ought to be treated. Specifically, the Stoics theorized that exile is among the things that 
are neither good nor bad in themselves, so being an exile is in fact indifferent to one’s 
happiness. Given this striking position, we might expect the Stoics to have no sympathy for 
refugees. Since those in exile suffer no evil, according to Stoic ethical theory, we might suppose 
that the Stoics believe that refugees and exiles are not suffering at all and so need no help. I 
will show that this supposition is mistaken. While Stoics regard living in exile as no obstacle 
to happiness, they are far from indifferent toward refugees and exiles. Rather, Stoics believe 
they must welcome and assist exiles because it is only right to do so. I will explain below how 
Stoic ethics entail this call to aid exiles. 
What Exile is and Why it is No Evil 
The natural place to start is Musonius Rufus’s essay That Exile is Not an Evil. This essay 
purports to be his reply to a person complaining about being exiled. One scholar has argued 
that in this essay Musonius adopts an exilic persona borrowed synthetically from the repertoire 
of Greek culture (Whitmarsh: 277). My interest focuses on the ten arguments presented in 
support of the essay’s title. Musonius offers three types of reason for thinking that exile is not 
an evil: (a) in exile we retain various valuable things, (b) we are rid of several nuisances, and 
(c) we (can) gain certain advantages. Specifically, (a) in exile we retain the company of true 
friends, the ability to acquire virtue, essential resources, free and candid speech (parrhēsia), the 
world itself, and the ability to endure exile; (b) exile rids us of false friends, distracting relatives, 
pointless political service, and soft, luxurious living that causes chronic illness; and (c) in exile 
one gains leisure and the opportunity to do good, and one can gain fame, improved bodily 
health, and the virtues of courage, justice, self-control, and wisdom. I now turn to examine 
Musonius’s ten arguments for the thesis that exile is not an evil and nothing to be upset about. 
The logic of the first argument (Exile 9.1; King: 44) may be easier to follow if it is 
reconstructed in regimented form. 
1. Exile does not deprive us of water, earth, air, or the sun and the other stars. 
2. Everywhere and in every way we have fellowship with other human beings. 
3. Hence, exile does not deprive us of human companionship. 
4. Before our exile, we did not use all of the earth. 
5. Hence, if we are removed from a certain part of the earth and from certain people, 
then this is not terrible. 
6. Our true, worthwhile friends would never betray or abandon us. 
7. Hence, even in exile we can associate with our true friends. 
8. If some of our acquaintances are insincere and false friends, then we are better off 
being removed from them (by exile) than associating with them. 
9. Therefore, no sensible person can be upset by being in exile. 
Recall Musonius did not abandon Rubellius Plautus when he was sent into exile, but instead 
remained true to his friend by faithfully sharing exile with him. In this first argument Musonius 
reasons that exile deprives us neither of what we need to survive (air to breathe, water to drink, 
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the light and heat of the sun), nor of the company of our real friends. Thus, we retain both 
what we need to sustain our bodies and what we need to bolster our spirits, so exile is no evil. 
Musonius’ second argument appeals to the idea of cosmic citizenship. For the sake of 
thematic continuity, I will postpone examining this argument until the penultimate section 
below, which is on cosmopolitanism. 
In his third argument Musonius contrasts real needs with superfluities. What we really 
need, he stresses, are learning and virtue. He reasons as follows: 
1. In exile people are not dragged into political service by a country that only seems to 
be theirs. 
2. In exile people are not bothered by those who merely seem to be friends. 
3. In exile people are not bothered by relatives who keep them preoccupied and distract 
them from their search for better things. 
4. Hence, exile provides people leisure and more opportunity to do good things than 
they had before they were exiled. 
5. Hence, exile never deprived anyone from learning what he needs to do and from acting 
accordingly. 
6. Therefore, exile cannot stop anyone from caring for his real needs and from acquiring 
virtue. 
As in the first argument, here too the distinction between true friends and false friends figures 
prominently. In exile, we are spared being pestered by people who merely pretend to be our 
friends. Musonius also implicitly makes a parallel distinction between one’s true country and 
one’s false country. Political service to one’s true country is worthwhile, but political service 
to a country that only pretends to be ours – our false country – is wasted drudgery. Exile 
spares us of the latter. Even some of our relatives deflect us from the pursuit of better goals, 
so exile shields us from their interference too. Exile provides us the opportunity to learn that 
acquiring virtue and doing good things are what it’s worth our while to do. 
Musonius adds to the potential benefits of exile in his fourth argument. He observes that 
exile transformed Diogenes from an ordinary person in his hometown of Sinope into a 
toughened philosopher – the first Cynic – who surpassed the other philosophers in his practice 
of virtue. Soft, luxurious living gave Spartiatikos the Lacedaemonian and others a weak chest, 
gout, and chronic illnesses. But exile accustomed them to live more austerely, “to follow a 
more manly lifestyle” (Exile 9.4; King: 45), and restored their health. “Thus, by improving 
people, exile helps them more than it hurts them with respect to both body and soul” (Exile 
9.4; King: 45). So, all things considered, Musonius concludes that for some people exile has 
even been advantageous. 
In his fifth argument Musonius elaborates on and emphasizes the distinction between 
manly austerity and soft living introduced in his previous argument. 
1. Lazy and shiftless exiles who are unable to act like men even when they are not in exile 
are generally at a loss and lack resources. 
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2. Wherever noble, industrious, and intelligent men go into exile, they flourish and do 
not feel deprived. 
3. Hence, we do not need many things unless we want to have a soft life. 
4. Therefore, exiles lack nothing essential. 
Musonius proceeds to defend an even stronger claim in his sixth argument: “men who 
are worthwhile not only would easily acquire the things most necessary for life when they are 
away from their home, but often would acquire many possessions as well” (Exile 9.6; King: 
46). He cites the examples of Odysseus, Themistocles, and Dion of Syracuse. When Odysseus 
arrived among the Phaeacians he was alone, naked, and shipwrecked – clearly worse off than 
any exile. Yet, despite the Phaeacians being strangers to him, Odysseus was able to acquire 
many possessions. When Themistocles was exiled from his home, instead of seeking help from 
friends he went to his enemies the Persians. Musonius says that the Persians presented 
Themistocles with the cities of Myus, Magnesia, and Lampsacus from which he could glean 
his living expenses. Musonius tells an even grander story about Dion the Syracusan. Dion was 
robbed of all his property and expelled from his homeland of Sicily by the tyrant Dionysius. 
Yet in exile Dion obtained enough money to raise an army of mercenaries, invade Sicily, and 
depose Dionysius. 
What of reputation? Musonius denies that exile necessarily stains one’s reputation in his 
seventh argument. “Everyone knows, after all, that many cases are judged wrongly, that many 
people are thrown out of their fatherland unjustly, and that some men who were good have 
been driven out by their fellow citizens” (Exile 9.7; King: 46). Aristides the Just (from Athens) 
and Hermodorus (from Ephesus) are his examples of men unjustly exiled. Diogenes of Sinope 
and Clearchus the Lacedaemonian are his examples of men whose fame actually grew in exile. 
In his eighth argument Musonius challenges the claim that exiles lose their freedom of 
speech (parrhēsia). First, he makes the qualification that “we should not say what we think 
always, everywhere, and to anyone at all” (Exile 9.8; King: 47). Then he construes exercising 
one’s freedom of speech as not keeping quiet about what one thinks. And what silences 
people? 
People do not refrain from saying what they think because they are exiles; they 
refrain because they fear that they will suffer pain, death, penalty, or some 
other such thing for speaking. By Zeus, it is not exile but fear that silences 
people. Those who still live in their own country – most people, that is – fear 
things that seem dangerous. The courageous man is as courageous in exile as 
he was at home; therefore he also says as boldly what he thinks when exiled as 
when he was not an exile (Exile 9.8; King: 47). 
Exile does not silence people; fear does. This idea that it is not external conditions (e.g., exile) 
that make people act or refrain from acting (e.g., be silent), but rather their emotional 
responses (e.g., fear), is a common refrain in the lectures of Musonius’s student Epictetus. In 
this text Musonius notes that most people fear things that seem dangerous to them. Of course, 
most people are not Stoics, and most people lack courage. But since courage goes everywhere 
the courageous person goes, exile will not deprive the courageous person of his free speech. 
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Musonius completes this argument with two examples of men whom exile never robbed of 
free speech – Diogenes the Cynic and he himself. 
Musonius’s self-reference marks the transition to his ninth argument, which links 
enduring exile with virtue. 
Have you or anyone else seen me crouching before anyone because I am an 
exile, or have you seen me thinking that my condition is worse than before? 
By Zeus, you must admit that you have never seen me groaning or moaning 
because of my exile. Even if someone has deprived us of our country, he has 
not taken away our ability to endure exile (Exile 9.9; King: 47-48). 
The ability to endure cannot be taken from Musonius or anyone else. He explains that he has 
shown why he denies that exile completely deprives a person of the things which many people 
consider good. But Musonius is a Stoic, and Stoics deny that what many people consider to be 
good is truly good. Non-Stoics consider pleasure, bodily health, wealth, material possessions, 
fame, prestige, political power, and similar things to be goods. So, Musonius reasons, even if 
exile deprives one of some or all of these supposed goods, exile does not deprive one of things 
that are truly good. Stoics maintain that the only true goods are virtues. 
The person in exile is not prevented from having courage, justice, self-control, 
wisdom, or any other virtue, just because he is in exile. When these qualities 
are present, they tend to honor and benefit a person and show him to be 
deserving of praise and fame. The absence of these qualities works to harm 
and shame him by showing him to be bad and without fame. Consequently, if 
you are a good and virtuous person, exile would not harm or diminish you, 
because you still have the things that can best assist and elevate you. And if 
you happen to be a bad person, it is vice, not exile, that harms you – vice, not 
exile, that brings you grief. You must work on freeing yourself from vice rather 
than from exile (Exile 9.10; King: 48). 
The virtues give us the ability to endure exile and, for that matter, every other condition that 
non-Stoics suppose are hardships. Accordingly, evil, not exile, is a terrible thing that afflicts 
everyone it touches with misery. 
The tenth and final argument in Musonius’s lecture on exile concerns the virtue of justice 
and the evil of injustice. That argument too will be taken up in the section on cosmopolitanism, 
after study of Epictetus’s and Seneca’s remarks about exile. 
Epictetus discusses exile in passages scattered throughout the Discourses and the Handbook. 
Like any good teacher, Epictetus is ever mindful of the opinions his students firmly hold when 
they enter his classroom. His students begin their education in Stoicism indoctrinated as non-
Stoics. Out of deeply ingrained habit non-Stoics give immediate credence to how things appear 
instead of scrutinizing those appearances. 
Outside of the classroom, if we see a person grieving, we say “He’s 
devastated.” If we see a consul, we say, “He’s a lucky guy.” If we see someone 
in exile, we say “How miserable.” If we see a beggar, we say “Wretched man, 
he’s got nothing to eat.” These are the sorry judgments we need to concentrate 
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hard to eradicate (Discourses 3.3.17-18; translations of Epictetus are mine 
though I consult Oldfather; Gill and Hard; and Dobbin 2008). 
Most people believe that exile is a terrible thing, even those who have never been exiled 
themselves. But Epictetus rejects this popular belief of non-Stoics. He believes that the belief 
that exile is bad is a terrible, sorry thing. It is that belief that a Stoic must work diligently to 
eliminate. 
An effective technique for eliminating the false belief that exile is bad is to frequently 
think about exile and other things that look like they are terrible. “Every day keep your eyes on 
death, exile, and everything that looks like it is terrible – death most of all – and you will never 
have a vile thought, nor desire anything too much” (Handbook 21). The daily practice of 
rehearsing the possibility of exile, death, and all seemingly awful events occurring serves as a 
kind of mental hygiene or calisthenics. It cleanses the mind of contemptible thoughts and 
reigns in immoderately strong desires. This cognitive training is vital for liberating oneself 
from the fears that enslave most people. Epictetus says “Prepare yourself, as Plato says, not 
just for death, but for torture, exile, flogging – and the loss of everything that does not belong 
to you. Otherwise, you will be a slave among slaves” (Discourses 4.1.172-73). Fear makes non-
Stoics slaves, according to Epictetus. No one fears Caesar himself, it is death, exile, loss of 
property, prison, and disenfranchisement they fear (Discourses 4.1.60). Non-Stoics fear losing 
what they believe belongs to them. Non-Stoics believe that their material possessions, wealth, 
good health, their very bodies, and living in their home country belong to them, whereas Stoics 
reject these beliefs as false. Since non-Stoics cling to these false beliefs about what things are 
truly theirs, they are dangerously unprepared to lose them. Non-Stoics set themselves up for 
misery by creating fears about the loss of things that can all too easily be lost. 
One’s native country is one such thing that can be lost. So, what if a tyrant were to 
threaten to exile Epictetus? Epictetus says that in this case, the tyrant is threatening his entire 
body, namely, to expel his body to a foreign land. But, if he feels that exile is nothing to him 
and does not fear it, then Epictetus is not threatened, even a little. Whereas if Epictetus fears 
anything the tyrant could do to him, then yes, it is Epictetus himself who is threatened 
(Discourses 1.29.6-8). This is why a person’s value judgments about what is good, bad, and 
neither good nor bad, are crucial. A person’s value judgments determine what he will regard 
as a threat and what he will fear. A real philosopher works to habitually make the right 
judgments. These right judgments will rid him of fear. 
A man Epictetus admires for not fearing exile is the Stoic philosopher Quintus Paconius 
Agrippinus. Epictetus tells the following story about him. Agrippinus received word that he 
was on trial in the senate – the kind of news that upsets non-Stoics. But Agrippinus calmly 
kept to his usual daily schedule of exercising at a particular hour in the morning. When he 
finished working out, the news arrived that he had been condemned. 
“To exile,” he asked, “or death?” “Exile.” “And what of my property?” “It has 
not been confiscated.” “Well then, let’s go to my villa in Aricia and have lunch 
there.” This shows what is possible when we practice what is necessary, and 
make our desire and aversion safe from any setback or adversity (Discourses 
1.1.28-30.) 
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Agrippinus’s equanimity preserved his daily routine, despite being convicted and sentenced to 
exile. Neither his exercise nor his lunch need be disrupted by the senate’s punishment. After 
all, what the senate does is not up to him, but deciding when to exercise and when and where 
to have lunch is up to him. Agrippinus has trained himself to desire only what he has power 
over – his decisions – and not to be afraid of exile, senators, or anything beyond his power. 
This Stoic practice is necessary to guarantee that our desires are never frustrated and our 
aversions are never realized. Exile deprives us of nothing that is necessary for living safe from 
misfortune. Agrippinus can adapt to whatever happens. If he is banished from Rome, then he 
can simply travel sixteen miles or so to Aricia and have lunch there. Food is as available there 
as it is in Rome. 
This story about Agrippinus illustrates that the punishment of exile is of very limited 
scope, so limited, in fact, that it is nothing to fear. Those with the legal authority to banish are 
far too weak to throw anyone off the planet. 
Exile? Where can they expel me? Nowhere outside the world, since wherever 
I end up, the sun will be there, the moon will be there, and the stars, there will 
be dreams, birds of augury, and other means of keeping in touch with the gods 
(Discourses 3.22.22). 
Here Epictetus repeats Musonius’s text in That Exile is Not an Evil (9.1; King: 44) and adds the 
remark about dreams and augury. 
And exile? Wherever I go it will be fine with me, for it was fine with me here, 
not because of the location, but because of my judgments which I shall carry 
with me. For no one can take these away from me, rather they are the only 
things that are mine, and they cannot be taken away, and I am content to 
possess them wherever I am and whatever I do (Discourses 4.7.14). 
A person’s judgments cannot be misplaced, left behind, or lost like keys. A person cannot be 
robbed of her values, like she can be of her purse. A Stoic’s identity lies in her beliefs, 
judgments, values, choices, intentions, and desires. These are the things that make her the kind 
of person she is. The good for a Stoic consists in her self-respect and integrity of character. 
These things she always takes with her into exile anywhere and everywhere.  
Like Epictetus, Seneca too distrusts ill-considered popular opinions about what things are 
good and bad, including the popular opinion about exile. In the Consolation to Helvia (Helvia) 
Seneca writes: “disregarding the judgment of the majority, who are carried away by the 
outward appearance of things, whatever the grounds for trusting it, let’s consider what exile 
really is. Of course, a change of location” (6.1; Fantham et al.: 52). Seneca observes that the 
rockiest, most barren islands – Sciathus, Seriphus, Gyara, and Cossura – are places of exile 
where some find it pleasant to stay by choice. Despite being barren rocks surrounded by 
dangerous cliffs, with the meagerest resources, the most uncivilized people, the most rugged 
topography, and the most intemperate climate, these islands are populated by more foreigners 
than natives. Seneca reasons that since some have voluntarily left their homeland to relocate 
to these places, a change of place is far from being a hardship (Helvia 6.4-5). Exile is only a 
change of place. A change of place is no hardship. So, Seneca rejects the popular opinion that 
exile is a hardship. 
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Exiles are often burdened by poverty. Does not poverty threaten happiness? Seneca does 
not think so: “Nothing is ever enough for greed, but for nature even too little is enough. The 
poverty of an exile therefore involves no hardship; for no place of exile is so lacking in 
resources that it can’t amply support a person” (Helvia 10.11; Fantham et al.: 60). Seneca is 
confident that even in exile a person armed with reason and resourcefulness can sustain 
himself. Consequently, Seneca states that exile is an empty word (vanum nomen) and no evil (On 
the Happy Life 21.1). This is a consequence of the Stoic doctrine that virtue is the only true 
good, vice the only true evil, and everything else is neither good nor evil but an indifferent. 
Seneca explains this doctrine as follows: 
I say that the following are indifferents (that is, that they are neither good nor 
bad): illness, pain, poverty, exile, death. Not one of these is glorious in itself, 
yet nothing is glorious without them. For what we praise is not poverty but 
the person who is not humbled or bowed down by poverty; not exile but the 
person who went into exile with a braver face than he would have worn when 
sending another . . . All such things are not in themselves either honorable or 
glorious, but any of them that virtue meets and handles is made honorable and 
glorious by it. In themselves, they are intermediate” (Letters on Ethics 82.10-12; 
Long and Graver: 273). 
The idea is that being in exile neither honors nor dishonors a person. Rather, it is how he 
conducts himself in exile that is either good or bad, noble or base, honorable or dishonorable. 
One’s location neither exalts nor disgraces anyone. 
Seneca offers a grim reminder about where everyone ends up: “[Death] shows exiles who 
are always straining their minds and eyes toward their homeland that it does not matter 
beneath whose soil one is buried” (Consolation to Marcia 20.2; Fantham et al.: 27). Since death 
sooner or later overtakes us all, everybody ends up in the ground, in the same place, as it were. 
The grave is everyone’s final destination. Thus, Seneca regards the country in which one’s 
grave is located as inconsequential. With this sobering reflection on death Seneca sees no 
reason to worry about which land one lives in. 
During his eight-year exile on Corsica, Seneca wrote to console his mother Helvia. In this 
consolation, he presents an extended argument against the opinion that his exile is an evil thing 
for him. Seneca explains that he has determined to conquer Helvia’s grief, not to dupe it. He 
will do this by showing that (a) in exile he experiences nothing that could cause him to be 
called wretched; (b) there is nothing about his exile that could make his relatives wretched on 
his account; and (c) his mother’s lot, which depends completely on his, is not hard to bear 
(Helvia 4.1). 
Seneca argues as follows. First, he notes that emigrants have many different reasons for 
leaving their country and seeking a new one. 
The destruction of their cities by enemy attack forced some to escape to 
foreign lands when they were robbed of their own; some were dislodged by 
political discord at home; some were sent out to relieve the burden caused by 
overcrowding of an excessive population; some were driven out by disease, by 
frequent earthquakes, or by some unbearable deficiencies in the unproductive 
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soil; some were beguiled by overblown reports of a fertile shore. Different 
people have been led by different causes to leave their homes, but this at least 
is clear: nothing has stayed where it came into being. The human race is 
constantly running this way and that, in a world so vast something changes 
every day: the foundations of new cities are laid and new names of nations 
emerge, while older powers are obliterated or transformed into a subsidiary of 
a stronger power. But all these migrations of peoples – what are they but states 
of communal exile? (Helvia 7.4-5; Fantham et al.: 54). 
Here Seneca adopts a global perspective – human beings are always on the move, traveling, 
and migrating in a world that itself constantly changes. Political exiles and war refugees are 
just two of the many groups engaged in ongoing relocation. 
Seneca observes that victors and vanquished alike were scattered throughout strange lands 
by the Trojan War. He adduces the legend of Aeneas: “To be sure, the Roman empire itself 
looks back to an exile as its founder – a refugee from his captured city who, taking with him 
its few survivors, was forced by fear of the conqueror to make for distant parts and was 
brought to Italy” (Helvia 7.7; Fantham et al.: 54-55). Thus, Seneca reasons that the 
displacement of peoples over the globe is nothing new, unusual, or troubling. Mobility is an 
inevitable fact of the human condition. Immigrants are the ancestors of virtually everyone on 
earth. 
To sum up, you’ll scarcely find any land which is still lived in by its original 
inhabitants; every population consists of mixed and foreign stock. One people 
has come after another, what one has viewed with disdain another has ardently 
desired, and one people has expelled another only to be driven out itself. So, 
it is by decree of fate that nothing remains where it is in the same condition 
forever. To offset the actual change of place, and barring the other 
disadvantages that attach to exile, Varro, the most learned of Romans, holds 
that this is remedy enough, that wherever we come, we inevitably experience 
the same order of nature. Marcus Brutus thinks it a sufficient compensation 
that exiles can take with them their own virtues. Even if anyone judges these 
two considerations, taken individually, inadequate to comfort the exile, he’ll 
admit that they are extremely effective in combination. For how little it is that 
we actually lose! Wherever we go, the two finest attributes will go with us – 
universal nature and individual virtue (Helvia 7.10-8.2; Fantham et al.: 55) 
This is the key premise in Seneca’s argument that being in exile is no evil. Seneca and Musonius 
Rufus agree that universal nature and her own virtue accompany the refugee wherever she 
goes. Universal nature equips a human being with reason and intelligence, and when fully 
cultivated and perfected, reason and intelligence become virtue. Thus, the Stoic refugee’s 
rational abilities and virtues of character enable her to adapt to the order of nature anywhere 
and everywhere. Exile cannot rob the Stoic of her virtuous mind, which is all she needs to live 
happily in accord with the order of nature. 
The Stoics’ conception of virtue is powerfully democratic in that virtue is available to 
everyone. Seneca writes: “Virtue closes the door to no one. It is open to all, admits all, invites 
all, the freeborn and freedmen and slaves and kings and exiles. Neither household nor wealth 
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in property determines its choice – it is content with the naked human being” (On Benefits 
3.18.2; my translation). This tenet is crucial to Seneca’s account because of how it connects 
with the most controversial doctrine of Stoic ethics, namely, the contention that virtue is the 
only true good. Seneca describes the doctrine like this: “Whatever is best for mankind lies 
beyond human control, and can be neither given nor taken away” (Helvia 8.4; Fantham et al.: 
56). This is because all that is best for a person lies in the mind. “Even places of exile are 
adequate for essentials, but not even kingdoms for superfluities. It’s the mind that makes us 
rich; it follows us into exile, and in the harshest wildernesses, when it has found enough there 
to support the body, it takes delight in its own plentiful goods” (Helvia 11.4-5; Fantham et al.: 
61). The wealth of virtue that the mind carries with it is effortlessly portable. On the Stoic 
view, then, only the body can be banished. 
And so the mind cannot ever be exiled, liberated as it is and akin to the gods 
and equal to all the world and all ages; for its thought moves around the entire 
heavens and is granted access to the whole of time, past and future. This mere 
body, the soul’s prison and chain, is tossed this way and that; punishments are 
inflicted on it, and villainies and diseases. But the mind itself is sacred and 
eternal, and no violent hand can be laid on it (Helvia 11.7; Fantham et al.: 61-
62). 
The body is vulnerable to robbery, prison, and exile. The mind, however, cannot be touched. 
The mind is free to think of any place, any time, and anything, no matter where the body is. 
This is why Seneca regards the mind as at home everywhere in this world and in any cosmic 
realm beyond it. His argument concludes: “let us hasten with undaunted step wherever 
circumstances lead us, let us travel over any lands whatsoever: no place of exile [can] be found 
in the world, [since nothing in the world] is alien to mankind” (Helvia 8.5; Fantham et al.: 56). 
The human mind can grasp the order of nature and the kinship of reason that human beings 
share with the gods. Therefore, Seneca reasons, a human being can be at home everywhere in 
the world because, from this Stoic perspective, the world itself is our home. Being exiled is no 
hardship and no evil to the Stoic because exile can only displace his body from one corner of 
his home to another. But no corner of his home is alien to him. Nor does any location alter 
his identity as a rational being capable of virtue. Nowhere can he be alienated from his sense 
of belonging to and in the cosmos. This is what Seneca means when he says that “to the wise 
man every place is his homeland” (Helvia 9.7; Fantham et al.: 58). 
Exile and Friends in Need 
In Stoic ethics the familial, social, civic, and occupational roles we play guide our actions 
in a wide array of situations (see Johnson). Some roles we are born into. Others we choose. 
Others are forced upon us. We choose our friends but not our parents. We become a refugee 
when that role is forced upon us. How might our role as a friend dictate dealing with exile? 
Epictetus provides a clue when discussing the limited purpose of divination. He explains that 
divination should be used only to learn about a future outcome, not when reason can be used 
to solve a problem. 
Do not, for example, resort to divination if you are duty-bound to come to the 
defense of your country or share in some danger threatening a friend. Suppose 
the seer declares the omens unfavorable – which, in cases like this, could spell 
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exile for you, physical injury, even death. And still reason demands that you 
stick by your friend, or help defend your country (Handbook 32.3; Dobbin: 
236). 
Our role as a citizen of a particular country dictates that when our country is threatened, we 
defend it. Similarly, our role as friend dictates that when danger threatens our friend, we face 
that danger with our friend. Defending our country and facing danger alongside our friend 
come with risks. Defending our country from tyranny, for example, could result in the tyrant 
punishing us with exile, bodily injury, or execution. Sharing in a danger that faces our friend 
could also result in us being exiled, physically harmed, or killed. We already know these things, 
so we certainly do not need to consult a diviner to find out what is portended. Portents of the 
future cannot tell us what we ought to do now. Rather, Epictetus insists, reason all by itself 
dictates that we do what we can to defend our country, no matter what. Reason demands that 
we must stick by our friend, come what may. 
Does the imperative to stick by your friend, no matter the risk, suggest how you ought to 
treat a refugee? Epictetus completes this text by remarking that all we have to do is to “consult 
the greatest prophet of all, the Pythian Apollo: he threw out of his temple someone who had 
not helped his friend when he was being attacked” (Handbook 32.3). Epictetus clearly thinks 
that Apollo wants us to help defend our friends from attack. Refugees are often attacked. But 
it would be too much of a stretch to interpret this text as implying that we ought to help 
defend refugees from attack. That is because our friends are unlikely to be refugees. For most 
of us it is far more likely that refugees are total strangers to us. Should we meet and become 
acquainted with a refugee, over time he or she may become our friend. Yet Epictetus’s 
imperative to stick by your friend does not necessitate that you must stick by a refugee (or an 
exile) who is not your friend. 
But what of a friend who is exiled? To the question “Why make a friend?” Seneca replies: 
“To have someone I can die for, someone I can accompany into exile, someone whose life I 
can save, even by laying down my own” (Letters on Ethics 9.10; Long and Graver: 41-42). For 
a Stoic, though one’s own exile is not a burden, Seneca explains that sharing in your friend’s 
exile is just the sort of thing friends do. As seen above, Musonius Rufus confirmed this by 
sharing his friend Rubellius Plautus’s exile. Nevertheless, the obligations of a Stoic to exiles 
and refugees that are not her friends cannot be securely derived from one’s role as a friend. A 
different role is needed for that purpose. 
Cosmopolitanism and the Idea of Dual Citizenship 
Given the Stoics’ view that being in exile constitutes no hardship for the person in exile, 
this might suggest that people in exile need no help at all. The Stoics’ position that exile is no 
evil and so does not detract from the exiled person’s happiness might seem to indicate that 
those who are not exiled need not be concerned with those who are. If exile is an indifferent, 
then would not a Stoic be indifferent toward exiles? Contrary to what we might expect, Stoics 
emphatically reject the view that exiles are not our concern and warrant no action on our part. 
Stoics are not at all indifferent to the needs of exiles. Indeed, Stoic ethics demands that exiles 
be welcomed into our communities, embraced by us as new neighbors, and provided refuge. 
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I now return to Musonius’s second argument in That Exile is Not an Evil. He appeals to 
the authority of Socrates (see Opsomer: 281-85) to argue as follows: 
1. A reasonable person believes that to be exiled is to be deprived only of a certain city. 
2. A reasonable person neither applauds a place nor rejects it because he holds it 
responsible for his happiness or unhappiness. 
3. A reasonable person relies on himself for his whole well-being and happiness. 
4. Socrates (correctly) believed that the world is the common homeland of all human 
beings. 
5. Hence, a reasonable person considers himself to be a citizen of the city of Zeus which 
is populated by human beings and gods. 
6. Hence, if you go away from where you were born and raised, you must not consider 
yourself to be exiled from your homeland. 
7. A person who lives in his own homeland but in a different house from the one in 
which he was born would be silly and ridiculous to complain and moan about this. 
8. Likewise, someone who thinks it a misfortune to be living in a different city from the 
one in which he happens to have been born could reasonably be considered to be 
witless and mindless (Exile 9.2-3; King: 44-45). 
The city of Zeus populated by human beings and gods is the cosmic city (cosmopolis). The 
citizen (politēs) of the cosmic city is the cosmopolitan (cosmopolitēs). So, Musonius thinks that 
belief in cosmopolitanism, coupled with committed self-reliance, defeats the belief that exile 
is an evil. Exiles who bemoan their fate reject cosmopolitanism due to the silly notion that 
their homeland is far narrower than it really is.  
Musonius ends his lecture on exile by considering whether, in a particular case, the 
punishment of exile is just. His argument takes the form of a constructive dilemma (Either p 
or q. If p, then r. If q, then s. Therefore, either r or s). 
Indeed, one of two things must be the case: you are in exile either unjustly or 
justly. If justly, how is it correct or proper to be upset over just things? If 
unjustly, our exile is caused not by our wickedness but by the wickedness of 
the people who sent us into exile. (And in this case they are wicked, since, by 
Zeus, acting unjustly – the thing which has befallen them – is the thing most 
hated by the gods.) (Exile 9.11; King: 48). 
We should embrace a just punishment, not be upset by it. So, if someone is justly exiled, then 
that outcome is good, not bad. But if someone is unjustly exiled, then it is the authorities who 
imposed that unjust punishment that are guilty of injustice. They are to blame for this wicked 
act, not the person who is the victim of the injustice. So, the tacit conclusion of this 
constructive dilemma is: either (r) it is wrong to be upset over being justly exiled, or (s) it is 
wrong to be upset over the injustice and wickedness of those who unjustly exiled us. Either 
way, our exile is not upsetting. 
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A non-Stoic may object to (s) and argue that we ought to be upset by the unjust, wicked 
deeds of others. But Stoics follow Socrates in holding that unjust deeds harm the perpetrator 
of the injustice, not the victim of the injustice. We are not responsible for the wickedness of 
others, so it is not our concern. Stoics think we ought to concern ourselves with acting justly 
ourselves, not worry about how others act. That is on them. 
Indeed, Musonius asserts, the gods hate unjust actions most of all. He concludes: “Both 
the gods and fair-minded men will agree that those who have been wronged – those like 
ourselves – deserve help, not hatred” (Exile 9.11; King: 48). Justice requires that we help 
victims of injustice, according to Musonius. These would include both persons unjustly exiled 
and, I argue, persons forced to flee their homeland to escape danger or persecution for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 
Surely refugees deserve to be endangered and persecuted no more than those unjustly exiled 
deserve to be exiled. Thus, by Musonius’s logic, both the gods and fair-minded people would 
agree that non-refugees owe help, not hatred, to refugees. 
Moreover, an obligation to aid exiles can also be derived from Seneca’s version of Stoic 
cosmopolitanism. He explains that the cosmopolitan has dual roles that reflect dual 
commonwealths. 
Let’s embrace the idea that there are two commonwealths. The one is vast and 
truly common to all, and includes the gods as well as mankind; within it, we 
look neither to this mere corner nor to that, but we measure the boundaries of 
our state by the sun’s course. The other is the one in which we are enrolled by 
the circumstances of our birth – I mean Athens or Carthage or any other city 
that belongs not to the whole of mankind but to a particular population. 
Certain people give devoted service to both commonwealths, the greater and 
the lesser, at the same time; some serve only the lesser, some only the greater 
(On Leisure 4.1; Fantham et al.: 224). 
Seneca implies in this text that it is a challenge to successfully serve both the greater and the 
lesser commonwealths. Those of modest ambition aim to serve one commonwealth or the 
other. But is not Seneca urging his fellow Stoics to tackle the loftier task of serving both 
commonwealths? 
A Stoic who seems to have taken up the challenge of serving both commonwealths was 
the emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. From an early age Marcus was groomed for imperial 
rule by emperor Hadrian. Since he enjoyed the emperor’s favor, Marcus never faced the 
possibility of exile like Seneca, Musonius Rufus, and Epictetus did. Indeed, when he became 
emperor Marcus gained the authority to banish others. In his private journal that has come to 
be known as the Meditations, Marcus reminds himself: “What benefits anyone is to do what his 
own nature requires. And mine is rational. Rational and civic. My city and state are Rome – as 
Antoninus. But as a human being? The world. So, for me, ‘good’ can only mean what is good 
for both communities” (Meditations 6.44; Hays: 79). Marcus echoes both Seneca’s and 
Musonius’s affirmation of Stoic cosmopolitanism, according to which every rational person is 
endowed with a kind of dual citizenship. In Marcus’s case, he was born into the city of Rome 
and took the name “Antoninus” when he was adopted by his maternal uncle. Thus, as an 
individual born at a particular place and time, Marcus became a citizen of Rome. But his 
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humanity and rationality, shared with all other human beings, also made Marcus a citizen of 
the world (cosmopolitēs). Thus, the Stoics believe that everyone is simultaneously a member of 
two communities, one local, the other global. For Marcus, this means that his good must 
consist in doing good for both Rome (the microcosm) and the world (the macrocosm). 
Doing good for Rome is easy to understand but perhaps rather difficult to accomplish. 
In his role as emperor, Marcus’s duty is to work to benefit all residents of the empire. But his 
duties extend beyond governing Roman citizens. Marcus is also a citizen of the entire world, 
which is populated by all rational beings of all nations. Marcus reflects: 
If thought is something we share, then so is reason – what makes us reasoning 
beings. If so, then the reason that tells us what to do and what not to do is also 
shared. And if so, we share a common law. And thus, are fellow citizens. And 
fellow citizens of something. And in that case, our state must be the world. 
What other entity could all of humanity belong to? And from it – from this 
state that we share – come thought and reason and law (Meditations 4.4; Hays: 
38-39). 
Since we share the ability to think and the ability to reason with all human beings, Marcus 
deduces that this shared reason also dictates what we should and should not do. Reason 
dictates what is good or bad, right or wrong, lawful or unlawful, just or unjust. So, the 
argument goes, the shared reason of all human beings makes everyone fellow citizens of the 
whole world. Our shared humanity makes us all neighbors living in the same shared 
community as intimately interconnected as limbs of the same body or bees in a hive (see 
Stephens 2012: 89-100). 
Marcus and Epictetus both emphasize the organic nature of the social connection among 
all human beings. Marcus invokes a graphic bodily image to illustrate the violence one inflicts 
upon oneself by severing oneself from the social whole. 
Have you ever seen a severed hand or foot, or a decapitated head, just lying 
somewhere far away from the body it belonged to . . . ? That’s what we do to 
ourselves – or try to do – when we rebel against what happens to us, when we 
segregate ourselves. Or when we do something selfish. You have torn yourself 
away from unity – your natural state, one you were born to share in. Now 
you’ve cut yourself off from it. But you have one advantage here: you can 
reattach yourself. A privilege God has granted to no other part of no other 
whole – to be separated, cut away, and reunited (Meditations 8.34; Hays: 107-
108). 
In a similar text Marcus describes an arboreal image to express the idea of social cohesion and 
the need people must preserve solidarity with one another. 
A branch cut away from the branch beside it is simultaneously cut away from 
the whole tree. So too a human being separated from another is cut loose from 
the whole community. The branch is cut off by someone else. But people cut 
themselves off – through hatred, through rejection – and don’t realize that 
they’re cutting themselves off from the whole civic enterprise. Except that we 
also have a gift, given us by Zeus, who founded this community of ours. We 
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can reattach ourselves and become once more components of the whole. But 
if the rupture is too often repeated, it makes the severed part hard to reconnect, 
and to restore. You can see the difference between the branch that’s been there 
since the beginning, remaining on the tree and growing with it, and the one 
that’s been cut off and grafted back. ‘One trunk, two minds.’ As the gardeners 
put it (Meditations 11.8; Hays: 149-50). 
To hate foreigners and reject refugees is to sever oneself from the greater commonwealth, as 
Seneca calls it, or the whole civic enterprise, as Marcus terms it. Thus, the Stoics regard 
xenophobia as a kind of self-inflicted mental disease. Yet Marcus believes that we also possess 
the remedy to this disease. We can cure ourselves of fear and hatred of those forced to flee 
their homelands in search of refuge in a new land, a new lesser commonwealth. We heal 
ourselves by reattaching ourselves to the greater commonwealth, affirming our identity as 
cosmopolitans, and reconnecting ourselves to the whole that unites all citizens of the world. 
How to Treat Refugees 
I suggest that the Stoic ideal of cosmopolitanism provides a clear answer to the question 
of our relationship with refugees. Since all refugees and all exiles are fellow citizens of our 
cosmopolis, reason demands that they be protected under the cosmic law. Our shared humanity 
makes them our neighbors. As our neighbors, we must share our community and its resources 
with them. Stoics believe that all human beings have a natural affinity with each other that 
grows from birth. This is their concept of oikeiōsis (see Pembroke; Blundell; Engberg-Pedersen; 
Inwood; and Reydams-Schils 2002, 2005). Our inborn sociability impels us to collaborate with 
others, live with others, and build strong networks of association and cooperation. The 
commonality of reason makes us all equal citizens of the world, equal cosmopolitans, sharing 
one state, one world, and governed by one common law. This common law is justice. Justice 
requires that we share our resources with those of our fellow citizens whose circumstances 
leave them in need. 
The Stoics reason that a person in exile need not be regarded as suffering from an evil 
condition for us to recognize that he needs and deserves our help. On the Stoic view, a refugee 
is not a helpless alien whose misfortune has nothing to do with us. Rather, a refugee is our 
fellow citizen whose misfortune we have both the power and the duty to ameliorate. By 
coming to the aid of a fugitive fleeing the horrors of war, we promote our own good, act as 
good neighbors and good citizens, affirm our own humanity, and welcome that person back 
into the security of the cosmopolis. We preserve and promote the gods’ cosmic law of justice. 
A final point can be made about Stoic psychology. The motive of the Stoic cosmopolitan 
to help refugees and exiles is not pity. The Stoic recognizes that fortune is fickle. The peace, 
prosperity, health, and security we enjoy today can be ripped away from us tomorrow. No one 
anywhere is safe from “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” (Shakespeare: Act 3, 
Scene 1; for classical Stoic consolations for exile in relation to exile in Shakespearean drama, 
see Kingsley-Smith: 112-13). All are subject to the vicissitudes of fate. So, the Stoic does not 
regard herself as superior to the person who needs help. But to pity another presupposes that 
the pitier believes that she is better off and higher than the one pitied. The pitier stoops to pity 
the pitiful person. Since the Stoic denies that she is above the exile or the beggar or the 
prisoner, this is one reason why the Stoic does not pity others. 
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A second reason is that the Stoic thinks it is unwise to take on the distress of a person 
who believes he is suffering true hardship. Seneca explains that the Stoic wise person will not 
feel pity, because pity is a feeling of suffering, and multiplying suffering is harmful, not helpful. 
Rather, “All the other things that those who feel pity want to do, the wise person will do gladly 
and with mind uplifted: he will bring succor to another’s tears, not join in them; he will give a 
hand to the shipwrecked, shelter to the exile, a coin to the needy” (On Mercy 2.6.2; Kaster and 
Nussbaum: 174). Thus, it is not shared misery that moves the Stoic to shelter the exile. It is 
recognition that justice, humanity, and reason demand that citizens of the world help each 
other. We all share the same home, after all. 
In conclusion, I have argued that while the Roman Stoics did not regard exile as an evil, 
they also held that we ought to help those in exile, welcome them into our communities, share 
our resources with them, and respect them as our fellow cosmic citizens. The Roman Stoics 
regarded their own exiles as indifferent to their own happiness because they viewed them not 
as obstacles to a good life, but as opportunities to do good. To classify exile as an indifferent 
in Stoic ethics does not mean that those in exile are to be ignored, nor does it justify being 
indifferent to their situation. Rather, the Stoics believed that a person’s moral character, his 
virtue or vice, is displayed precisely in how he deals with exile, illness, pain, poverty, and death. 
And dealing with exile includes both one’s own exile and the exiles of others. The virtue of 
justice demands that the Stoic treat refugees and exiles well, since they are our fellow cosmic 
citizens. Therefore, from the Stoic perspective, Aeneas, his father, his son, and their few 
comrades who survived the sack of Troy became refugees by accident, but they, like us, are 
citizens of the world by birth. As such they and all refugees deserve refuge in our local 
communities. Stoics teach that we must make our home theirs. 
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